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A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Outbound 
International Tax Reform* 
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.** 
Robert J. Peroni*** 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article will discuss operating principles for 
accomplishing international tax reform regarding U.S. persons 
(i.e., “outbound” international income tax reform). It also will 
discuss some specific reform proposals that we recommend be 
included in an international tax reform bill. 
I. SOME SUGGESTED OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
TAX REFORM OF OUTBOUND TRANSACTIONS 
A.   International Tax Reform Should Be Part of an Integrated 
Reform Effort 
Because the U.S. tax rules for international transactions 
involving U.S. persons do not operate in a vacuum, fundamental 
international tax reform needs to be part of a broad-scale reform 
of the U.S. tax system, rather than an independent project. To be 
specific, it is not possible to properly design the U.S. 
international tax rules for outbound transactions without 
knowing such things as whether fundamental corporate 
integration reform will be adopted, whether a capital gains 
preference will be retained and to what extent it will be 
broadened or narrowed, the general tax rate structure that will 
be adopted (including the top marginal rates on individuals and 
corporations, if corporations continue to be treated as separate 
taxpayers), how foreign persons will be defined and taxed, and 
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how the tax system will treat complex financial products and 
intellectual property transactions (more generally as well as in 
the international tax rules). Resolution of these and other 
broadly foundational issues will have an important effect on any 
re-design of the U.S. international tax rules. 
B.   The International Tax Part of Tax Reform Should Not Lose 
Revenue 
Given our large (although recently much-reduced) budget 
deficits, as well as many important and worthy competing direct 
government programs that need to be funded, the international 
component of tax reform should not result in a net reduction in 
tax revenues and probably needs to result in a net revenue 
increase. So, for example, a move to a territorial tax system that 
does not have serious anti-tax base erosion provisions 
(particularly with respect to intellectual property income) should 
be a non-starter since such a system would result in a net 
revenue decrease (and a potentially significant one). As another 
example, so-called simplification measures in the international 
area that lose significant revenue, such as those relating to the 
foreign tax credit and the anti-deferral regimes, as applied to 
large multinational corporations, should be non-starters in this 
era of budget austerity. 
C.  International Tax Reform Is Important to Perceived Fairness 
of the Tax System Overall 
It is important that the international tax aspects of tax 
reform not undermine the actual and perceived fairness of the 
tax system. Public support for the tax system is indispensable in 
our self-assessed tax regime, and tax “reform” provisions that 
appear to substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the U.S. income 
tax on foreign income of U.S. multinational corporations 
(“MNCs”) are likely to be perceived by the press and public as 
“special interest” provisions that result from well-funded 
lobbying efforts. Thus, although such provisions may involve 
relatively small amounts of revenue as compared with other 
features of the income tax system, such as the home mortgage 
interest deduction or the tax-deferred treatment of various 
healthcare and retirement savings vehicles, they are likely to 
undermine public support for the tax system. 
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D.   International Tax Reform Should Not Extend or Enhance 
Tax Incentives to Shift Business and Investment Activities or 
Income Abroad 
The international tax system should not be restructured in 
such a way as to create or enhance tax incentives to shift 
business and investment activities from the United States to 
low-tax or no-tax foreign countries. Such incentives strip the U.S. 
tax base of badly needed revenue and may result in loss of 
domestic jobs (although the economic evidence on this point is 
inconclusive).1 Moreover, economic efficiency is undermined if 
taxpayers choose tax-favored foreign investments producing 
lower pre-tax returns over domestic investments with higher 
pre-tax returns that are fully subject to U.S. tax. This is one of 
our major concerns with territorial systems for taxing 
international income because those systems do encourage this 
inefficient behavior.2 
E.   Competitiveness Claims Have Been Largely Overstated and 
Unsubstantiated 
Commentators who oppose making the current worldwide 
system into a real worldwide system and instead propose 
replacing the current U.S. international tax system with a 
territorial system often have argued that such a change is 
necessary to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs.3 The 
two of us, together with a third co-author (Stephen Shay), have 
taken the position that this advocacy is in substance an attempt 
to argue for a competitiveness subsidy provided through the tax 
 
 1 It is clear, however, that in recent years the de facto territorial system of the 
United States has been correlated with substantial growth in the foreign employment of 
U.S. MNCs. See Sudeep Reddy, Domestic-Based Multinationals Hiring Overseas, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 29, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732476340457 
8430960988848252; Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Cut U.S. Jobs While 
Expanding Abroad, 128 TAX NOTES 1102 (2010); Scott Thurm, U.S. Firms Add Jobs, but 
Mostly Overseas, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001 
424052702303990604577367881972648906.  
 2 See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of 
1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165, 1166 (1996). 
 3 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TAX REFORM: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX 
RULES AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSES 5 (2006); R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax 
Policy and International Competitiveness, 82 TAXES 213, 242 (2004); Pamela F. Olson, 
Peter Merrill, Michael Mundaca, Michael Reilly & Jaime Spellings, Staking New 
Ground: Exploring a Potential Territorial System of Taxation, 90 TAXES 53, 60, 64–66 
(2012); Phillip R. West, Across the Great Divide: A Centrist Tax Reform Proposal, 130 TAX 
NOTES 1025, 1040 (2011). For a commentator who supports adoption of an exemption 
system on the grounds that it would increase worldwide economic efficiency, rather than 
on competitiveness grounds, see Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign 
Business Income, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2000). 
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system for the foreign business and investment activities of such 
U.S. corporations.4   
In our work, we have pointed out numerous flaws in this 
competiveness argument.5 Our most basic critique objects to 
defining competitiveness in terms of improving the after-tax 
profitability of already successful U.S. MNCs instead of defining 
it in terms of improving the living standard of American 
individuals.6 In our view, the appropriate focus of international 
and other tax reforms is on the effect of such reforms on the 
living standard for U.S. individuals, and the proponents of 
competitiveness theory/territorial taxation have failed to 
establish how this living standard will be enhanced by providing 
U.S. tax subsidies to U.S. MNCs with respect to their foreign 
business and investment activities.  
Moreover, even if one were to define competitiveness with 
reference to its effect on the profitability of U.S. MNCs, the 
supporters of low or zero U.S. tax on the foreign-source income of 
those entities have never convincingly established with strong 
empirical evidence that U.S. MNCs need a tax subsidy to 
 
 4 For explanations of the subsidy effect of an exemption system, see J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its 
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 528–41, 547–51 (2008) [hereinafter 
Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis]; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., 
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial 
Taxation Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1091 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, 
Worldwide vs. Territorial]. Professor Edward Kleinbard has aptly opined that the 
competitiveness argument in favor of a territorial system “is indistinguishable from a call 
for export subsidies, on the grounds that other countries offer export subsidies.” Edward 
D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 129 (2011). For a 
leading commentator arguing that a territorial system, as is typically enacted, is a 
prohibited export subsidy under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Tax, Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition: Reflections on the FSC 
Controversy, 21 TAX NOTES INT’L 2841, 2843 (2000). 
 5 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worldwide vs. Territorial, supra note 4, at 1085–86; 
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 
EMORY L.J. 79, 106–10 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than 
Exemption]; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S. 
Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 
456–59 (2012) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System]. 
 6 For example, the World Economic Forum defines competitiveness more broadly as 
“the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country.” WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 4 (2013), 
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitiveness Report_2013-
14.pdf. This Report focuses on twelve factors, which it terms “pillars,” in measuring each 
country’s competitiveness, including its institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market 
efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, 
business sophistication, innovation, and market size. Using this approach to measure 
competitiveness, the Report ranked the United States seventh overall in 2012–2013 and 
fifth overall in 2013–2014. See id. at 15; see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 88 (2011) (noting 
this alternative approach to defining competitiveness).   
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compete successfully in the global marketplace.7 Indeed, a recent 
study by a leading public finance economist has concluded that 
the competitiveness argument “does not seem to have much 
empirical support.”8 This same study found an absence of strong 
empirical support for the argument that low U.S. tax burdens on 
U.S. MNCs’ foreign-source income increases U.S. domestic 
investment,9 another claim sometimes made by advocates for 
territorial taxation. In addition, another prominent public 
finance economist noted that the competitiveness argument 
conflicts with standard economic theory, stating: “It can 
generally be shown that the United States would still be better 
off, or at least no worse off, if it taxes foreign and domestic 
investments by its firms at the same rate, even if other countries 
do not.”10   
Finally, even if one could establish that U.S. MNCs needed a 
subsidy funded through the U.S. international tax system, this 
subsidy, like other tax expenditures, should have to undergo a 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis in which it competes against other 
meritorious programs for the currently inadequate U.S. revenue 
stream.11 Such a subsidy should be continued and broadened by 
Congress only if it survives this scrutiny. 
F.  Fairness Concerns About International Tax Reform Do 
Matter 
We currently have a hybrid income tax system that is 
“heavily grounded on a fairness notion—that taxpayers should 
contribute to the cost of government in relationship to their 
comparative economic well being or ability-to-pay.”12 Thus, if we 
 
 7 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH 
U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 56–57, 61 (2000), available at http://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/subpartf.pdf. 
 8 Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational 
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247, 
268 (2012). 
 9 Id. at 257. 
 10 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL 
INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 17 (2012) [hereinafter GRAVELLE, OPTIONS AND 
CHALLENGES], available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42624.pdf; see also ERIC TODER, 
TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: 
WHO COMPETES AGAINST WHOM AND FOR WHAT? 2 (2012), available at www.taxpolicy 
center.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=412477. 
 11 See Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra note 4, at 
439. 
 12 J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in 
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX 
REV. 299, 350 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International 
Taxation]; see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL 
STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877-1929, at 8–15 
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are going to retain this hybrid income tax as a primary source of 
revenue at the federal government level (instead of, for example, 
shifting to a cash-flow consumption tax base), we must consider 
the impact of various international tax reform proposals on the 
distribution of the tax burden based on ability-to-pay. 
International tax reform proposals, such as many versions of 
territorial tax systems, which undermine the fair allocation of 
the income tax burden by removing most foreign-source active 
income from the tax base, should be enacted only if their 
demonstrable efficiency and simplification benefits outweigh 
their costs in terms of fairness. Although applying ability-to-pay 
fairness analysis to the international tax area is complicated by 
the facts that so much of the income is earned through C 
corporations and that foreign countries have competing claims to 
tax this income, fairness concerns should play an important role 
here as they do in other areas of tax reform.13 In our view, in the 
international tax area, fairness concerns have not received the 
attention they deserve in crafting specific reform proposals or in 
analyzing the tax policy efficacy of the various proposals. 
G.   Simplification Concerns Do Matter but May Have to Give 
Way to Efficiency and Fairness Concerns 
The U.S. international tax system has many complex 
provisions and some (perhaps many) of those provisions could be 
substantially simplified without undermining their basic 
purpose. Needlessly complex tax provisions, including those in 
the international tax area, create a deadweight loss for society by 
increasing the costs of compliance for both taxpayers and the 
government, without achieving any offsetting economic benefit. 
Increased compliance costs can result in higher prices in goods 
and services for consumers and less capital being available for 
investment in productive businesses of the taxpayer.14 Increased 
administrative costs may lead to a less efficient collection of 
revenue by the government and fewer resources for worthy direct 
government programs. Therefore, simplification of the federal 
income tax, in general, and the international income tax 
provisions, in particular, is an important goal of any tax reform 
effort. However, it is important to remember that most 
foreign-source income is earned by sophisticated corporate 
taxpayers who have highly competent tax advisors to help them 
 
(2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-to-pay concept as a fundamental principle of taxation 
in the United States). 
 13 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra note 12, at 
354. 
 14 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM: AN INTERIM 
REPORT 1 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERIM REPORT]. 
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navigate the complexity of the U.S. international tax rules. In 
fact, in many cases, these taxpayers voluntarily elect into 
complexity by structuring intricate transactions primarily to 
attain significant tax benefits (often in more than one country 
through tax arbitrage).15 Moreover, many international 
transactions are inherently complex; thus, the tax rules that 
govern them are likely to have a substantial and unavoidable 
amount of complexity as well. And the important competing 
considerations of efficiency and fairness may work at 
cross-purposes with simplicity concerns when constructing 
international tax reform proposals. Finally, compromise among 
competing objectives itself breeds complexity;16 coherent, 
principled systems are typically less complicated than hybrid 
systems resulting from compromise, but such coherence is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the give and take of the 
political process as legislation works its way through Congress. 
Thus, although tax simplification is an important aspect of tax 
reform, it is not likely to be the major focus of serious 
international tax reform efforts, particularly with respect to 
taxation of foreign business activities. Stated differently, 
whatever international tax rules emerge from the tax reform 
process are likely to be somewhat complex in nature (i.e., they 
may be simpler than current law but not simple), and other 
competing norms, such as economic efficiency and fairness 
concerns, are likely in many important specific cases to trump 
simplification concerns. 
II. SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTED INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORMS IN 
THE BUSINESS/INVESTMENT AREA 
A.   Making the Current U.S. System a Real Worldwide System 
(The First-Best Solution) 
1. Introduction 
The United States purports to have a worldwide system for 
taxing the income of U.S. persons; i.e., U.S. citizens, resident 
aliens, and domestic corporations are subject to tax on their 
worldwide incomes, regardless of source. To mitigate 
international double taxation, a foreign tax credit is allowed for 
qualifying foreign income taxes. The foreign tax credit is subject 
to a number of limitations. The most important of these are in 
section 904, which limits the total foreign tax credits in a taxable 
 
 15 See Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit 
Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391, 394 (2003) [hereinafter Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide]. 
 16 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. 
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year to the pre-credit U.S. tax liability on the foreign-source 
portion of a taxpayer’s worldwide taxable income. Section 904 
also prevents a taxpayer from offsetting (i.e., cross-crediting) 
high foreign taxes on non-passive foreign-source taxable income 
against the U.S. tax liability on passive foreign-source taxable 
income.17 However, the current U.S. international tax system has 
two important defects that undermine its potential as a true 
worldwide system—deferral and cross-crediting. Fundamental 
international tax reform needs to deal with those two defects and 
make the U.S. system a real worldwide system. 
2. End Deferral by Enacting a Pass-Through Regime for U.S. 
Shareholders of Foreign Corporations or Some Other 
Full-Inclusion System 
The first major defect (deferral) is that under current U.S. 
tax law, if a U.S. person invests abroad directly or through an 
unincorporated branch or pass-through entity, the U.S. person 
pays tax currently on the income earned abroad, subject to a 
foreign tax credit. By contrast, if the U.S. person earns 
foreign-source income through a separate foreign corporation, 
then the U.S. tax on the foreign-source income is generally 
deferred until it is repatriated to the United States through a 
distribution or until the U.S. person sells the foreign 
corporation’s stock at a price that reflects the accumulated 
foreign income.18 This deferral privilege is subject to two 
principal exceptions (i.e., anti-deferral regimes), the controlled 
foreign corporation (“CFC”) provisions of Subpart F in the Code 
(sections 951–965)19 and the passive foreign investment company 
(“PFIC”) provisions (sections 1291–1298).20 These highly complex 
anti-deferral regimes provide some restraint on the deferral 
privilege but are outdated and do not reflect the nature of 
modern global commerce. They are filled with loopholes and have 
not been restructured to address contemporary deferral 
tax-planning strategies. Thus, they do far too little in limiting 
deferral.   
This deferral privilege operates as a tax subsidy accorded to 
U.S. taxpayers who locate their business and investment 
activities in low-tax or no-tax foreign countries, a tax subsidy 
 
 17 See I.R.C. § 904(a), (d)(1) (2012). 
 18 See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD C. PUGH, 
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 25, 303, 485–86 (4th ed. 2011). 
 19 I.R.C. §§ 951–965. For a detailed discussion of the Subpart F provisions, see 1 
JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. B3 (1992 & Supp. 
2013). 
 20 I.R.C. §§ 1291–1298. For a detailed discussion of the passive foreign investment 
company provisions, see 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 19, at ch. B2. 
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that would not survive rigorous cost-benefit scrutiny under a tax 
expenditure analysis.21 This deferral privilege also violates the 
tax policy goal of locational neutrality by encouraging U.S. 
corporations to shift business and investment activities to low- or 
zero-tax foreign countries and to engage in aggressive 
cross-border tax planning strategies that shift income 
(particularly from highly mobile intangible property) to low-tax 
foreign countries.22 Moreover, according to the most recent tax 
expenditure estimates by the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, the deferral privilege results in the loss of about 
$273.1 billion of revenue for fiscal years 2013–2017.23 This 
foregone revenue could be better used for other purposes, 
including an across-the-board corporate tax rate reduction. 
We have developed a proposed solution to this first defect 
(the untoward consequences of deferral). In a series of articles, 
we have recommended that deferral be ended by the United 
States enacting a pass-through system with respect to U.S. 
shareholders’ shares of income earned by foreign corporations, at 
least with respect to 10-percent-or-more U.S. shareholders.24 
Such shareholders would be able to obtain direct foreign tax 
credits for any creditable foreign taxes paid with respect to the 
foreign income that passes through from the corporation. Thus, 
the indirect credit provisions of sections 902 and 960 would be 
repealed because they would no longer be necessary. Because 
deferral would be ended completely with respect to 
10-percent-or-more U.S. shareholders of foreign corporations 
under this proposal, the Subpart F income provisions, with all of 
their complicated exceptions and operating rules, would be 
repealed. Previously taxed income rules would be retained to 
 
 21 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, 
Deferral: Consider Ending It, Instead of Expanding It, 86 TAX NOTES 837, 846 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending Deferral]; Robert J. Peroni, 
Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don’t Mend It—Why Should We Be 
Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (2001) [hereinafter 
Peroni, End It, Don’t Mend It]; Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure 
Analysis, supra note 4, at 528–41, 547–51. 
 22 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 486, 488–89; Fleming, 
Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 85–86, 96–97. 
 23 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 30 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter STAFF 
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES]. 
 24 See Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. 
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 986–94 (1997) [hereinafter 
Peroni, Back to the Future]; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, 
Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU 
L. REV. 455, 507–19 (1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious]; 
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending Deferral, supra note 21; Peroni, End It, Don’t 
Mend It, supra note 21; Robert J. Peroni, The Proper Approach for Taxing the Income of 
Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1579 (2001). 
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ensure that income when distributed by the corporation to the 
shareholders is not taxed again at time of distribution. 
Transition rules would need to be carefully crafted to ensure that 
untaxed earnings deferred under prior law are subject to U.S. 
tax. A number of approaches to taxing such deferred earnings 
would need to be considered. 
As a less drastic reform, but one that would still 
substantially improve the anti-deferral rules of current law, a 
new category of Subpart F income could be created for low-taxed 
foreign income.25 The new category would not have exceptions for 
same-country income or for manufacturing income.26 
3. Substantially Restrict Foreign Tax Credit Cross-Crediting 
by Enacting a Per-Country Limit or Expanding the Number 
of Basket Limitations 
The second major defect of the U.S. international income tax 
system (cross-crediting) is that under current U.S. tax rules, a 
U.S. taxpayer has substantial opportunities to essentially 
eliminate the residual U.S. tax (i.e., the U.S. tax remaining after 
allowance of the foreign tax credit) on foreign-source income that 
is subject to low or no foreign taxes by cross-crediting high 
foreign taxes on some types of active business income against the 
residual U.S. tax on other types of business income earned in 
low-tax or zero-tax jurisdictions, including many types of 
intellectual property income that are highly mobile and often 
lightly taxed. This means that the foreign tax credit is going 
beyond its primary function of preventing double taxation from 
discouraging efficiency-enhancing cross-border transactions. 
Instead, the foreign tax credit is being used by U.S. taxpayers to 
ensure that certain foreign income is not taxed anywhere. 
The foreign tax credit limitations in section 90427 have been 
substantially weakened by recent legislative developments, 
particularly the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act.28 The 2004 
legislation essentially gutted the foreign tax credit limitations by 
reducing the number of limitation categories in section 904 to 
two: the passive category income limitation and the general 
 
 25 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 
36 MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Putting 
Lipstick on a Pig]. 
 26 See id. 
 27 I.R.C. § 904 (2012). For a detailed discussion of the foreign tax credit limitation 
provisions in Section 904, see 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 19, at ch. B4. 
 28 For our critique of the 2004 Jobs Act provisions, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & 
Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign Tax Credit Limitations and Cutting the 
Repatriation Tax—What’s ETI Repeal Got To Do With It?, 104 TAX NOTES 1393 (2004).  
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category income limitation.29 In addition, the look-through rules 
in section 904(d)(3) that apply to royalties and other deductible 
payments from a controlled foreign corporation to its U.S. 
shareholders essentially place such payments in the same 
limitation basket as high-taxed foreign business income, where 
the U.S. residual tax on such payments is eliminated through 
foreign tax cross-crediting even though these payments are 
usually deductible and therefore untaxed in the jurisdiction in 
which the foreign corporation is organized.30 Loose limitations on 
foreign tax cross-crediting provide a strong incentive for U.S. 
taxpayers with profitable, active businesses in high-tax foreign 
countries to locate other business and investment activities in 
low-tax or zero-tax foreign countries to exploit cross-crediting 
opportunities that reduce the U.S. residual tax on the lightly 
taxed foreign income.31 This is a violation of well-established 
economic efficiency norms. 
We have also developed a proposed solution to this defect. In 
a number of articles, we have argued that our current 
international tax system needs to be made into a true worldwide 
system by enacting more serious limitations on cross-crediting.32 
Our preference would be for Congress to enact a per-country 
foreign tax credit limit, with separate single-country basket 
limitations for both passive income and all other income arising 
within each individual country.33 No other categories or baskets 
based on type of business income should be necessary under a 
per-country limit. The per-country limit does a better job of 
restricting cross-crediting than even the multi-basket foreign tax 
credit limitation enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
and thus helps ensure that the foreign tax credit provisions 
accomplish their core purpose of ameliorating international 
double taxation, instead of creating untaxed foreign income. We 
believe that criticisms of the per-country limitation as being too 
 
 29 See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (2004) (after enactment of the 2004 Jobs Act). 
 30 See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 142−44. 
 31 See, e.g., Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 393. 
 32 See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and 
Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103 (2003) 
[hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Reform of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules]; 
Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 994–1000; Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide, 
supra note 15, at 394–95; Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The 
David R. Tillinghast Lecture “What’s Source Got to Do With It?”: Source and U.S. 
International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81 (2002) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, 
Source and U.S. International Taxation]; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Putting Lipstick on a 
Pig, supra note 25. 
 33 See Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Reform of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, supra 
note 32, at 121–23; Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 995–96; Peroni, A 
Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 394–95; see also Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source 
and U.S. International Taxation, supra note 32, at 153.  
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complex and unadministrable34 are overstated and that it is 
possible to construct an administratively practicable per-country 
limitation.  
As an alternative, we would recommend that the foreign tax 
credit baskets for certain types of lightly taxed and highly mobile 
business income be reinstated, e.g., the separate basket 
limitations for shipping income and financial services income. 
Even better, thought should be given to creating a separate 
basket limitation for low-taxed business income.35 
4. Other Reforms: Changes to the Source Rules 
Source rules serve different purposes in international tax 
law. In the inbound foreign tax area governing the U.S. taxation 
of foreign persons, the source rules serve to help define the extent 
and limits of the U.S. income taxation of such persons. In the 
outbound context, they mainly serve to help define the amount of 
the foreign tax credit limitation. Yet the Internal Revenue Code 
often uses the same source rules for both functions.   
Our view is that the source rules in the Code should be 
revised to reflect the purpose for which they are being used. So, 
in the foreign tax credit area, the source rules should be revised 
to generally treat income as foreign-source income for foreign tax 
credit limitation purposes “only if it is subject to a substantial tax 
by a foreign country that is consistent with international norms 
for asserting source-based taxing jurisdiction.”36 Thus, using this 
proposed approach, various types of income of U.S. residents that 
are typically not subject to taxation in a foreign country, such as 
space and ocean income, or international communications 
income, should be treated as U.S.-source income for foreign tax 
credit limitation purposes. Similarly, income that is exempt from 
U.S. tax by reason of a tax treaty between the United States and 
the country in which the income arises should be treated as 
U.S.-source income for foreign tax credit limitation purposes.37 
Finally, the inventory export source rule in sections 861(a)(6) and 
 
 34 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 323–26, 328 (1987). 
 35 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Putting Lipstick on a Pig, supra note 25. For 
discussion of earlier proposals to separate the general income limitation into a high-tax 
limitation basket and a low-tax limitation basket, see Michael J. McIntyre, Separate 
Basket Limitations in Theory and in Practice, 70 TAX NOTES 1393, 1398 (1996); Peroni, 
Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 999–1000. 
 36 Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 396; see Shay, Fleming & Peroni, 
Source and U.S. International Taxation, supra note 32, at 149–51. 
 37 See Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 396. Alternatively, such 
treaty-protected income could be placed in its own foreign tax credit limitation basket to 
prevent cross-crediting. See Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with 
Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1775 (1995). 
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862(a)(6) results in export sales income being treated as 
foreign-source income by reason of the seller of inventory goods 
passing title to them abroad even though this income is usually 
not subject to foreign tax by reason of the foreign tax law itself or 
under a U.S. income tax treaty. This means that the U.S. 
seller/exporter can eliminate the U.S. residual tax on such export 
sales income through cross-crediting with foreign taxes on other 
highly-taxed foreign business income. This source rule makes 
little policy sense. Thus, under revamped source rules, income 
from inventory sales should be treated as U.S.-source income, 
unless the taxpayer has a foreign office or fixed place of business 
to which the inventory sale is attributable and which results in 
the taxpayer incurring a significant foreign income tax on such 
income.38   
5. Other Reforms: Expand and Revamp Earnings Stripping 
Rules in Section 163(j) 
The earnings stripping rules in section 163(j) are designed to 
protect the U.S. tax base by disallowing interest deductions for 
U.S. tax purposes in situations where the recipient of the interest 
is exempt from U.S. income tax by reason of a tax treaty or 
otherwise. However, the provision is triggered only if a specified 
debt-equity ratio is exceeded and other rules substantially 
narrow its scope and reduce its effectiveness. Our view is that 
these rules should be broadened to cover other deductible 
payments such as royalties and service payments and that the 
trigger and other rules for calculating the limitation need to be 
substantially revised to broaden the impact of these limitations. 
We are currently working on another article in which we develop 
this thesis.  
6. Other Reforms: Formulary Apportionment is No Panacea 
U.S. MNCs might be expected to regard the present U.S. 
international income tax system as perfectly satisfactory39 
because, as discussed above, it creates ample opportunities to 
achieve a zero U.S. tax, and even a negative U.S. tax in certain 
cases.40 However, the system relies on the highly complex 
 
 38 See Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 396; see also Shay, 
Fleming & Peroni, Source and U.S. International Taxation, supra note 32, at 151. 
 39 Indeed, a major association of U.S. MNCs has expressed a preference for 
maintaining the current U.S. system while enlarging its loopholes. See Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC’s Report on Territorial Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 687 
(2002). 
 40 See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5. 
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arm’s-length method41 to allocate income between domestic 
parent corporations and their foreign subsidiaries, it is very 
complex in additional ways,42 it raises little revenue, it causes 
taxpayers to incur high tax-planning and transaction costs in 
order to create favorable results, and it imposes large 
administrative costs on the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 
A U.S. exemption or territorial system would limit the 
United States to taxing only business income earned within its 
borders and foreign-source business income would be exempt 
from U.S. income taxation. Such a system would be simpler and 
would involve lower costs than the present U.S. system with 
regard to tax planning and enforcement. The current U.S. 
international income tax system indirectly creates virtually the 
same end result as an exemption system (no U.S. tax on foreign 
business income) through deferral and cross-crediting. 
Consequently there has been considerable interest in replacing 
the current system with an explicit territorial or exemption 
system that would directly, and more simply, impose a zero U.S. 
tax on foreign-source business income. 
There are two types of explicit exemption 
systems: traditional territoriality and formulary apportionment. 
Traditional territoriality uses source rules and the 
above-mentioned arm’s-length approach to distinguish between 
domestic-source business income that is subject to tax and 
exempt foreign-source income. This arm’s-length approach43 is 
widely criticized because it is highly complex, readily 
manipulable, very expensive for taxpayers to comply with and for 
the IRS to administer, theoretically incoherent,44 and quite 
ineffective in dealing with the shifting of intangible property 
income to low-tax foreign countries. 
The second type of territoriality is formulary apportionment. 
Instead of using the arm’s-length method, it distinguishes 
between taxable domestic income and exempt foreign income by 
combining the worldwide incomes of a U.S. MNC and its foreign 
 
 41 The arm’s-length method seeks to ascertain the prices that would be charged in 
transactions between related parties if they were independent entities dealing at arm’s 
length and then to determine tax consequences as if those arm’s-length prices had been 
used by the related parties. See I.R.C. § 482 (2012); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1–1.482-9 (1994). 
For a detailed discussion of the arm’s-length method and the provisions of section 482 and 
the regulations issued thereunder, see 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 19, at ch. A3. 
 42 For example, computation of the credit allowed by the United States for foreign 
taxes can be very complicated, as are the anti-deferral rules of Subpart F, as discussed 
above. 
 43 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 44 The arm’s-length method is theoretically incoherent in that it does not take into 
account the economic efficiencies of related-party business integration and probably 
cannot do so. 
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subsidiaries and then allocating this income to the United States 
(taxable income) and to foreign countries (exempt income) in 
proportion to the amounts of certain factors of production of the 
U.S. MNC and its subsidiaries that are located in the United 
States and in foreign countries. For example, if 75% of the 
relevant production factors of a U.S. MNC and its subsidiaries 
were located in foreign countries, 75% of the combined worldwide 
income would be exempt foreign-source income and the 
remainder would be domestic-source income taxable by the 
United States. 
Both forms of territoriality are a poor second-best to real 
worldwide taxation because both forms require the 
revenue-constrained United States to give up a residual tax on 
business income earned in low-tax foreign countries, and both 
encourage U.S. MNCs to locate real business activity and the 
related employment in low-tax foreign countries where the 
resulting income is excluded from the U.S. tax base. The United 
States would do much better to follow our recommendations 
above, and adopt real worldwide taxation.45 
Territoriality advocates, however, push back against that 
recommendation and argue in favor of formulary apportionment 
as the way to achieve territoriality without the problems of the 
arm’s-length method. The most often-discussed production 
factors that would be used by a formulary system in place of the 
arm’s-length method to distinguish exempt foreign income from 
taxable domestic income are assets, payroll, and sales. Assets are 
a substantial proxy for business operations and payroll is an 
indisputable proxy for jobs. Thus, formulary apportionment 
clearly creates an incentive for U.S. MNCs to move their business 
operations and jobs, as well as their sales, to low-tax foreign 
countries because to the extent they do so, they shift their 
combined worldwide income into the exempt foreign category. 
The negative effect on the U.S. tax base and U.S. employment is 
clear. 
Some formulary advocates have argued that sales are 
significantly immobile and cannot be shifted into a low-tax 
country. Thus, these advocates maintain that a formulary 
apportionment system that allocates the income of a U.S. MNC 
between the United States and foreign countries exclusively in 
proportion to U.S. sales and foreign sales will not result in the 
U.S. tax base migrating to low-tax foreign countries.46 
 
 45 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Putting Lipstick on a Pig, supra note 25.   
 46 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating 
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. 
TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
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The validity of this argument depends on how the location of 
a sale is identified. If the longstanding U.S. title-passage rule is 
used in a formulary system with respect to sales of goods,47 it will 
be easy to locate all sales of goods in low-tax countries, outside 
the U.S. tax base, by arranging sale terms so that title passes in 
low-tax locations. 
Consequently, some have suggested locating sales of goods 
where the first sale to an independent buyer occurs.48 If that test 
is used, then MNCs will move their sales out of the United States 
by selling their products to independent foreign distributors who 
sell into the United States. By imposing contractual performance 
and conduct standards on the foreign distributors, the U.S. 
MNCs can preserve most of the vertical integration advantages 
of doing their own distributing. And if sales of services are 
located where the work is done, the work can be performed in 
low-tax countries with delivery being made over the Internet.49 
The sales location approach to formulary appointment does 
have the salutary effect of ending the game of locating foreign 
intangibles in low-tax foreign countries and then creating low-tax 
foreign income by paying deductible royalties from subsidiaries 
in high-tax countries to intangible licensing subsidiaries in 
low-tax countries. This is because intra-group payments are 
irrelevant under a formulary system with combined reporting. 
MNCs can, however, approximate the result of this game by 
locating product sales in low-tax countries when product prices 
reflect high value intangibles.50 
The current U.S. system is badly in need of replacement. If a 
real worldwide system is not politically possible as a replacement 
choice, then in our view, either form of territorial system is 
preferable to the present bollixed U.S. international income tax 
system, and the issue is which of the two types of territorial 
system should be chosen. 
Regarding whether a multilateral decision is possible, a few 
commentators believe that it is plausible to expect that the 
United States and the world’s major economic powers can agree 
on a universal allocation formula that will uniformly apportion 
international income among them in a way that avoids double 
taxation and that they all accept as a reasonable accommodation 
of their tax claims. We see no evidence that this kumbaya hope is 
 
 47 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960) (providing that the location of a sale of goods is 
generally where the seller’s rights, title, and interest pass to the buyer).  
 48 See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 46, at 509, 513. 
 49 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Putting Lipstick on a Pig, supra note 25.   
 50 Id.   
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plausible. If the United States is to adopt formulary 
apportionment, it will have to do so unilaterally. 
In that context, the problem must be seen as a choice 
between (1) traditional territoriality that perpetuates the costly 
arm’s-length transfer pricing method that has been very feeble in 
restraining the shifting of income from intangibles but does 
exercise a modicum of restraint on the shifting of income from 
sales of tangible property and (2) formulary apportionment that 
eliminates the arm’s-length system but that creates virtually 
unrestrained income shifting opportunities. What a choice! 
B.   Properly Designed Exemption or Territorial System (A 
Second-Best Solution) 
Thus, we strongly prefer avoiding the above-described 
dilemma by reforming the U.S. international tax system into a 
real worldwide system. However, if Congress instead decides to 
reform the system by adopting an exemption or territorial 
system, we believe that such a system, whether of the traditional 
or formulary variety, should be structured in such a way as to 
have measures that protect against tax base erosion and 
minimize the distortive economic effects of an exemption system. 
In addition, if a territorial system is properly designed, its 
adoption will actually raise revenue (rather than lose revenue) as 
compared with the current U.S. international tax regime. As we 
have more fully explained in a prior article,51 such a properly 
designed territorial system should not be based on unsupported 
competitiveness assertions and should have the following design 
characteristics: 
1. Only active foreign business income that meets a 
subject-to-tax requirement should be eligible for exemption 
treatment. In other words, exemption treatment should not apply 
to dividends from a foreign corporation unless either a 
meaningful foreign tax has been paid with respect to the active 
business earnings from which the dividends are distributed or 
the dividend payor is a resident of a country that has a bilateral 
tax treaty with the United States that reciprocally waives this 
subject-to-tax requirement;52 
2. Passive income should not be eligible for exemption even 
in the rare cases where it has been subject to a meaningful 
 
 51 See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5. 
For our earlier analysis of exemption proposals, see J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. 
Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) Tax System, 
109 TAX NOTES 1557 (2005). 
 52 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 
413–26. 
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foreign tax. Such income is highly mobile and subject to 
locational choice largely based on tax considerations;53 
3. Royalties, interest, services payments, and other 
foreign-source items paid by a foreign corporation to a U.S. 
person that do not bear a significant foreign tax should not 
qualify for exemption treatment, even if they relate to an active 
foreign business;54 
4. The current tax exemption for 50% of the income from 
U.S. export sales, which is accomplished through cross-crediting 
and the inappropriate source rules in sections 861(a)(6), 
862(a)(6), 863(b), and 865(b), and the regulations issued under 
those provisions, should be eliminated;55 
5. Qualifying income earned by a U.S. corporation through 
an unincorporated branch should be eligible for exemption, 
notwithstanding the various significant problems that need to be 
worked out in order to extend exemption treatment to branch 
income;56 
6. The allocation of domestic expenses to foreign-source 
exempt income must be accomplished in a more realistic and 
appropriate way than the inadequate 5-percent “haircut” that is 
part of some congressional territorial proposals57 (i.e., under 
those proposals, 5% of the dividends received from a foreign 
corporation would not be eligible for exemption treatment as a 
substitute for applying actual allocation-and-apportionment rules 
to the U.S. corporate shareholder’s expenses). We believe that 
either factually based allocation-and-apportionment rules (i.e., a 
reformed and modified version of the 
allocation-and-apportionment rules under current law) should 
apply to expenses incurred by a U.S. corporation or, 
alternatively, a more significant “haircut” (i.e., greater than 5%) 
should be used, and serious consideration should be given to 
having the percentage vary based on the industry in which the 
U.S. corporation’s business income is earned (these varying 
percentages could be established by the Treasury Department 
through administrative guidance pursuant to specific statutory 
authorization);58 and 
 
 53 Id. at 426–28. 
 54 Id. at 431–35. 
 55 Id. at 435–38, 446–48. 
 56 Id. at 441–45. 
 57 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R., 113th Cong. § 245A(a) (2014) (the 
95-percent participation exemption deduction in the second Camp proposal).  
 58 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 
448–52. 
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7. The exemption system should prohibit the deduction 
against U.S. taxable income of foreign losses arising from foreign 
business activities producing income eligible for exemption 
treatment. Allowing the deduction of such losses is inconsistent 
with fundamental income tax theory (i.e., a taxpayer should not 
be allowed the double tax benefit of exempting foreign-source 
business income from tax and deducting for U.S. tax purposes 
expenses that relate to such income) and would in some cases 
result in a negative effective tax rate on exempt foreign-source 
income.59 
As our earlier article explained, a territorial system lacking 
these features would go beyond the United States’s international 
law obligation to alleviate international double taxation, and to 
that extent, the United States would simply be engaging in a 
relinquishment of badly needed tax revenue in favor of the U.S. 
multinational corporate community.60 As we noted in that article, 
advocates of a U.S. territorial system for taxing foreign income 
would likely find the above-described design features that would 
raise revenue as ipso facto objectionable because, in their view, 
they would undermine the competitiveness effects of a U.S. 
exemption system.61 This response is often augmented by an 
argument that the United States must enact an exemption 
system lacking the design features described above, 
notwithstanding that it goes beyond the requirements of 
international law, represents bad tax policy, and loses badly 
needed revenue, because our trading partners have done so.62 
Thus, in the view of these territoriality advocates, the United 
States must follow those other countries and vigorously join this 
race to the bottom, so that U.S. multinationals can compete on a 
level playing field with their foreign rivals.63 This use of these 
 
 59 Id. at 452–56; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 
116–17. 
 60 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5,  at 
458–59. 
 61 Id. at 459 (citing Barbara Angus, Tom Neubig, Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, 
The U.S. International Tax System at a Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 59 (2010) 
(generally objecting to a subject-to-tax requirement)); Olson, Merrill, Mundaca, 
Reilly & Spellings, supra note 3, at 65 (same and also generally objecting to a territorial 
regime that raises revenue); Martin A. Sullivan, Let’s Promote the Competitiveness of All 
American Businesses, 133 TAX NOTES 1175, 1179 (2011) [hereinafter Sullivan, Promote 
Competitiveness of All] (“U.S. multinationals are not interested in territorial 
systems . . . [that effect] an overall tax increase. Nor do U.S. multinationals want a 
territorial system that is revenue neutral relative to current law. They want a territorial 
system that reduces their taxes.”). 
 62 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 
459. 
 63 Id. But see GRAVELLE, OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 10, at 17 (“[M]oving 
to a territorial system because other countries have generally done so does not mean such 
a system is desirable either for them or for the United States.”).  
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competitiveness arguments suffers from the same flaws as its 
application to the general question of whether the United States 
should adopt a territorial system as a replacement for the 
current U.S. international tax system.64 
In 2011 and early 2014, Representative David Camp 
released two draft proposals of a participation dividend 
exemption system for taxing foreign income.65 Both drafts 
contain only some of the recommended features above and seem 
to be based on the unsubstantiated competitiveness claims by 
territorial proponents. Thus, we do not recommend that Congress 
adopt either version of the Camp proposal in their current forms. 
In order to mold Representative Camp’s proposed territorial 
system into a principled regime that does not undermine the U.S. 
tax base, more work needs to be done with respect to anti-base 
erosion features and to excluding from territorial treatment 
income that has not been subject to meaningful income taxation 
in any country. 
III.  INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM IN THE INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER 
AREA 
A.  Repeal the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion in Section 911 
Under section 911 of current law, a U.S. citizen or resident 
alien who meets either a bona fide residence test or physical 
presence test can exclude up to $99,200 (as indexed for inflation 
for the 2014 year)66 of foreign earned income67 and a housing cost 
amount. Proponents of section 911 argue that it is necessary to 
make U.S. businesses that employ U.S. workers abroad 
competitive in the global marketplace by not requiring them to 
absorb the higher costs of their U.S. expatriate employees living 
and working abroad through higher pay to those workers that 
would have to be passed on to their customers in the form of 
 
 64 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 
459. 
 65 See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND 
MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH A PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION 
SYSTEM FOR THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME (2011); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, DISCUSSION DRAFT 
OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS TO REFORM THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: TITLE IV—PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION SYSTEM FOR THE 
TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME (2014). For our critique of Representative Camp’s first 
discussion draft of this proposed exemption system, see Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Territoriality in Search of Principles and Revenue: Camp 
and Enzi, 141 TAX NOTES 173 (2013). 
 66 See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 543 (containing the inflation 
adjustments for 2014). 
 67 See I.R.C. § 911(a), (b)(2)(D)(i) (2012). 
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higher prices.68 However, it seems questionable for the U.S. tax 
system to provide a “subsidy to U.S. businesses that results in an 
understatement of the true costs of operating abroad, thereby 
providing a [tax] incentive” for those businesses to shift 
operations to foreign countries.69 Moreover, this exclusion 
distorts individuals’ behavior by providing a tax incentive for 
U.S. workers to accept employment abroad rather than in the 
United States in situations where they would not have done so 
without the tax incentive.70 In addition, the section 911 exclusion 
is not limited to U.S. individuals who work for U.S. employers 
abroad but also applies to U.S. individuals working for foreign 
employers, thus strangely providing a tax subsidy for such 
foreign employers to invest in business operations abroad with 
U.S. workers rather than in operations in the United States.71 
This exclusion also violates the traditional tax policy criteria of 
horizontal and vertical equity and, thus, is inconsistent with the 
ability-to-pay concept that underlies an income tax base.72 
Section 911 also adds complexity to the tax system with a 
provision that has many requirements that are the subject of 
detailed regulations73 and many judicial and administrative 
interpretations.74 Finally, according to the most recent tax 
expenditure estimates by the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, section 911 results in the loss of about $30.3 billion of 
revenue for fiscal years 2013–2017 from the foreign earned 
income exclusion and about $6.1 billion of revenue for fiscal years 
2013–2017 from the housing exclusion.75 This foregone revenue 
(while not huge in relation to total U.S. budget expenditures) is 
badly needed for other purposes and section 911, if subjected to a 
rigorous cost-benefit, tax expenditure analysis, would surely fail 
 
 68 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 455. 
 69 Id.; see also Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 1008. 
 70 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 455; Peroni, Back to the 
Future, supra note 24, at 1008. In other cases, a U.S. taxpayer who would have worked 
abroad anyway is nonetheless receiving a windfall in the form of the U.S. tax avoided on 
the exclusion amount. See Renée Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens 
Abroad: Incentive or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 157–58 (1985). 
 71 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 455; see also Peroni, Back to 
the Future, supra note 24, at 1008. 
 72 See Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 1008–09; see also Sobel, supra 
note 70, at 156–57 (criticizing the regressive nature of the section 911 exclusion). U.S. 
persons who work in the United States have to pay full U.S. tax on their earned income 
while those who choose to work abroad and earn the same amount of earned income can 
exclude it up to the limits in section 911. Id. 
 73 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.911-1–1.911-8 (2014). 
 74 See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 453–75 (detailed casebook 
discussion of section 911 judicial and administrative authorities); 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, 
supra note 19, ¶ B1.04 (detailed treatise discussion of the section 911 judicial and 
administrative authorities). 
 75 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES, supra 
note 23, at 30. 
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such scrutiny. Thus, fundamental reform of the U.S. 
international tax rules should include repeal of this poorly 
designed and inequitable tax subsidy provision.76 
B.   Expand the De Minimis Rule in Section 904(j) and Make It 
Mandatory 
Section 904(j) of current law contains a de minimis rule that 
exempts certain individual taxpayers from the foreign tax credit 
limitations in section 904. The de minimis rule applies if an 
individual taxpayer’s only foreign-source income for the taxable 
year is “qualified passive income” (i.e., passive income reported 
on the requisite payee tax information statement),77 the 
creditable foreign taxes paid during the year do not exceed $300 
($600, for married taxpayers filing a joint return), and the 
taxpayer elects to apply the rule. This de minimis rule does help 
to simplify the tax law and seems to have worked well so far as it 
goes. It makes little sense to require individuals with limited 
amounts of foreign taxes and foreign income to navigate the 
complexities of the section 904 limitations. However, we believe 
that the de minimis rule is too narrow in scope and should cover 
a larger amount of foreign taxes (e.g., $10,000 for single 
taxpayers and $20,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint 
return).78 We also would not require that the taxpayer’s 
foreign-source gross income be limited to passive income and, 
instead, would apply the de minimis rule to taxpayers with 
foreign-source business income, provided that the amount of the 
creditable taxes does not exceed the dollar limitations (as 
expanded under this proposal) and the taxpayer’s total 
foreign-source gross income on which the foreign taxes were 
imposed is not less than the amount of the foreign taxes to be 
credited.79 The taxpayer, of course, would be required to identify 
and report as taxable income such income on his or her tax 
return for the taxable year for which the foreign tax credits were 
sought to be taken. Finally, there is no reason that this de 
minimis rule should be subject to election and, thus, we would 
have it apply whenever its requirements are met. However, we 
would continue to limit the availability of this de minimis rule to 
 
 76 See Joseph M. Dodge, Some income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 71, 134–35 (2013) (advocated repeal of section 911). Note that the section 911 
exclusion is not necessary to mitigate international double taxation because a U.S. citizen 
or resident alien who pays foreign income tax on his or her foreign earned income receives 
a U.S. credit for those foreign taxes (subject to the limitations in Section 904).   
 77 See I.R.C. § 904(j)(3)(A) (2012). 
 78 See Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 24, at 1001; Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s 
Guide, supra note 15, at 393–94; see also Dodge, supra note 76, at 135–36; David R. 
Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 187, 233–34 (1990). 
 79 See Dodge, supra note 76, at 136. 
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individual taxpayers; the de minimis rule should not apply to 
corporate taxpayers.80  
CONCLUSION 
International tax reform will not be easy and there is a great 
danger that Congress could make things worse by adopting a 
defective exemption system in place of our current less-than-ideal 
worldwide system. We have suggested a number of operating 
considerations that we hope are kept in mind in designing the 
international tax reform provisions. We have also suggested a 
number of specific international tax reforms that we hope will be 
adopted. 
 
 80 Allowing corporate taxpayers to use this de minimis rule would undermine its 
simplification benefits and would create opportunities for individuals to abuse the rule by 
conducting integrated business operations in multiple corporate entities. See Peroni, A 
Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 15, at 393 n.8. 
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